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This paper characterizes, empirically, the conduct of monetary policy in a small open economy.
In particular, using as a case study the Chilean inﬂation targeting experience, we assess the role of
the exchange rate in the determination of the interest rate. We conclude that Chile has adopted what
Svensson (1997) calls a gradual approach to targeting inﬂation. This means, in practice, that the
central bank modiﬁes its policy instrument, the interest rate, whenever expected inﬂation or output
deviate from its target. In this context, we ﬁnd evidence that the monetary authorities also react to
real exchange rate misalignments. This reaction is comparatively larger than that found in developed
economies. Finally, the evidence, although not conclusive, seems to suggest a non linear response
to exchange rate misalignments: the central bank reacts strongly to large deviations rather than to
small ones.
∗This article is part of my PhD dissertation at Cambridge University. I am grateful to my supervisors Dr. Petra Geraats
and Dr. Peter Tinsley for their constant support and orientation.
11 Introduction
Inﬂation targeting has become the new paradigm in monetary policy. As is noted by Fry et al (2000),
between 1990 and 1998 the number of countries with explicit inﬂation targets increased from 5% to
54%. Overall, this monetary policy framework has been adopted by 54 economies throughout the world.
These economies include 25 developing countries, like Chile, China, Jamaica, Tanzania and Vietnam;
16 transitional economies like the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Russia and 13 developed
economies like Australia, Canada, New Zealand, U.K. and Sweden.
In this context, most of the countries that are pursuing inﬂation targeting are small open economies
that use a short term interest rate1, usually set by the central bank, as the main policy instrument. In
general, however, empirical research on the way that central banks target inﬂation has been limited only
to developed economies. In fact, Clarida et al (1998) provide structural estimations of the monetary
policy reaction functions in some European countries, Japan and the USA. They conclude that an
inﬂation forecast based (IFB) policy rule provides a good characterization of the way in which monetary
policy has been conducted in those countries. In addition, they ﬁnd that exchange rate considerations
do not play an important role in the monetary policy design, even though most of the countries that
they analyze are small open economies.
For developing countries, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) provide evidence suggesting that central banks
react to exchange rate misalignments. In particular, they conclude that, in emerging economies interest
rates are used as the preferred means of smoothing exchange rates ﬂuctuations. This evidence, however,
is not based on structural estimations of monetary policy rules, as in Clarida et al (1998). In fact, Calvo
and Reinhart (2002), derive monetary policy rules from vector autoregressive (VAR) estimations. In
these circumstances, those rules do not describe the systematic behavior of the central bank. In fact,
as is noted by Clarida (2001), in a VAR equation the monetary policy response to the exchange rate
does not have a clear interpretation: it can be an explicit response to exchange rate misalignments, a
response to expected inﬂation (that is aﬀected by the current level of the exchange rate) or, it can be
a combination of the two. Therefore, a monetary policy equation, derived from a VAR, cannot be used
to describe the systematic behavior of central banks.
1Central banks, in general, have abandoned the use of monetary aggregates as a policy instrument. There are two
reason for this: i) interest rates are usually easier to interpret by the public and ii) given that money demand is unstable,
it is diﬃcult to predict the impact that changes in monetary aggregates will have on output and inﬂation.
2In this context, not knowing how the central bank systematically reacts to diﬀerent macroeconomic
disturbances may become problematic. In particular, it makes it diﬃcult to analyze the welfare impli-
cations of alternative policy rules as well as to provide policy recommendations as to how to react in
the face of various shocks.
In this chapter, we characterize the systematic behavior of the central bank in a small open and
emerging economy. In particular, we investigate how the monetary authorities react to exchange rate
misalignments and output deviations from trend. We follow Clarida et al (1998) and estimate an IFB
rule that allows for a response to output and to the exchange rate. In this framework, these responses
have a clear interpretation: they reﬂect the importance that output and the exchange rate have per se
for the central bank. Hence, it is possible to determine whether the monetary authorities have additional
objectives besides controlling inﬂation.
We use, as a study case, the Chilean inﬂation targeting experience of the nineties. This is an
interesting case because Chile is a small, open and emerging economy and, as is noted by Schmidt-
Hebbel and Tapia (2002), it was the second country in the world to adopt inﬂation targeting, setting
its ﬁrst annual target in September 1990.
The main conclusions of this chapter are as follows. First, an IFB monetary policy reaction function
provides a good characterization of the way in which the Chilean central bank (CCB) designs its policy.
In particular, the CCB reacts to expected inﬂation deviations from target. In this context, the monetary
authorities follow a “ﬂexible” approach in targeting inﬂation; they smooth output deviations even when
inﬂation is on target. This means that output stability is per se a monetary policy objective. Second,
exchange rate considerations play an important role in the conduct of monetary policy. In fact, besides
reacting to expected inﬂation and output, the CCB moves interest rates whenever the real exchange
rate deviates from trend and, compared with other inﬂation targeting countries, the policy response
to exchange rate is larger. Third, the response to exchange rate misalignments is nonlinear; the CCB
reacts more aggressively to large real exchange rate misalignments than it does to small ones. Finally,
as is observed in many other countries, the CCB smooths interest rates considerably; the degree of
interest rate inertia is high.
This chapter is organized as follows. Following Clarida (2001), Section 2.2 presents a simple frame-
work in order to estimate the systematic monetary policy responses to inﬂation, output and the exchange
3rate. Section 2.3 discusses the main characteristics of the inﬂation targeting regime in place in Chile
since 1990. Section 2.4 speciﬁes the IFB monetary policy rule to be estimated and describes the way in
which the relevant variables are constructed. In particular, following Harvey and Jaeger (1993), we use
structural times series models to detrend the relevant variables. Section 2.5 presents the main results,
whereas Section 2.6 performs some robustness exercises. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes the chapter.
2 Identifying the Systematic Components of Monetary Policy
As is noted by Clarida (2001), within a VAR framework it is not easy to identify the systematic
responses of the monetary policy instrument to the main macroeconomic variables. In fact, the policy
responses that are obtained in a VAR, either in its reduced or its structural form, do not necessarily
have a structural interpretation. In this section, we illustrate this point with a simple example. In
particular, following Clarida (2001), we analyze how the policy coeﬃcients in a reduced form VAR2
may be interpreted. The aim of this example is to show why it is diﬃcult, in a VAR framework, to
determine whether a central bank in an open economy targets inﬂation with an independent concern
for the exchange rate.
Let’s assume that the central bank targets inﬂa t i o ni naﬂexible way. This means that, besides
inﬂation, the stability in output is also an objective of monetary policy. In this case, the central bank
does not target the exchange rate. In particular, suppose that the central bank’s policy instrument, the
interest rate, can be described by a simple IFB policy reaction function
rt = ρπEt{πt+n} + ρyyt−1 +  r,t (1)
where rt is the interest rate controlled by the central bank, Et{πt+n} is the expected inﬂation
deviation from a predetermined target, yt−1 is the lagged deviation of output from the trend level and
 r,t is a random shock to the interest rate. The ρπ coeﬃcient describes the systematic response to
inﬂation shocks. On the other hand, the ρy coeﬃcient represents the systematic response to output
deviations. In this case, the central bank does not have any systematic response to exchange rate
misalignments.
2A more complete explanaition, that includes a structural VAR, is given in Clarida (2001).
4Now, assume that expected inﬂation depends on past information about some macroeconomic vari-
ables. In particular, expected inﬂation can be expressed as follows
Et{πt+n} = θ1yt−1 + θ2πt−1 + θ3rt−1 + θ4qt−1 (2)
where qt−1 is the real exchange rate3, expressed as a percentage deviation from the steady state.
On the other hand, the coeﬃcients θ1, θ2, θ3 and θ4 represent the response of expected inﬂation to
the lagged values of output, inﬂation, the interest rate and the real exchange rate, respectively. In
particular, an increase in the real exchange rate has a positive impact on expected inﬂation, therefore
θ4 > 0.
Replacing equation (2) into the monetary policy reaction function, equation (1), gives the policy
interest rate equation
rt = ρπ {θ1yt−1 + θ2πt−1 + θ3rt−1 + θ4qt−1} + ρyyt−1 +  r,t (3)
the above expression is the interest rate equation implicit in a reduced form VAR that contains the
set of variables zt =( yt,πt,r t,q t). In this case, the innovation in the VAR equation (3) has a structural
interpretation; however, the reduced form coeﬃcients do not necessarily reﬂect the systematic responses
of the central bank to the various macroeconomic variables. In particular, in this VAR, the interest rate
response to real exchange rate misalignments is diﬀerent from zero, but it does not have a structural
interpretation. This response is given by
∂rt
∂et−1
= ρπθ4 > 0( 4 )
and reﬂects the fact that the exchange rate inﬂuences the interest rate only because it is an indicator
of future inﬂation and not because the exchange rate is a policy objective per se. The response in (4)
is the product of the policy reaction to expected inﬂation, ρπ, and the response of the inﬂation forecast
to an exchange rate depreciation, θ4. Hence, the VAR evidence suggests a positive policy response to
the exchange rate even if this variable is not an explicit policy objective.
3T h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ei sd e ﬁned as qt = p
∗
t + et −pt where p
∗
t is the level of foreign prices (in logs), et is the nominal
exchange rate (in logs) reﬂecting the domestic price of foreign currency and pt is the domestic consumer price index (in
logs). Hence, an increase in qt is a depreciation.
5Now, consider the alternative case in which the real exchange rate is per se a policy objective. In
such a case, the IFB rule in (1) takes the form
rt = ρπEt{πt+n} + ρyyt−1 + ρqqt−1 +  r,t (5)
where the ρq coeﬃcient captures the systematic policy response to exchange rate misalignments. As
before, expected inﬂation evolves according to equation (2). Now, replacing equation (2) into equation
(5) gives the policy interest rate equation
rt = ρπ {θ1yt−1 + θ2πt−1 + θ3rt−1 + θ4qt−1} + ρyyt−1 + ρqqt−1 +  r,t (6)
which, again, represents the interest rate equation derived from a VAR. In this case, the interest
rate response to the real exchange rate is given by
∂rt
∂et−1
= ρπθ4 + ρq > 0( 7 )
where the above response contains two elements, the systematic policy reaction to the exchange rate,
ρq, and the policy response to the exchange rate component of the expected inﬂation, ρπθ4. Hence,
when the exchange rate is a policy objective per se, the VAR response will be positive. However, this
response will incorporate both the systematic reaction to the exchange rate and the reaction to expected
inﬂation. In short, from the VAR the ρq coeﬃcient cannot be obtained. Also, another drawback of the
VAR approach is that, in general, the other monetary policy coeﬃcients, ρπ and ρy cannot be recovered
either.
The above exercise has shown that, in a VAR framework, it is diﬃcult to interpret the interest
rate response to the exchange rate. More speciﬁcally, from the VAR coeﬃcients the systematic policy
r e s p o n s et ot h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ec a n n o tb ei d e n t i ﬁed.
To overcome this identiﬁcation problem, Clarida et al (1998) and Clarida (2001) suggest that one
should estimate, directly, the IFB monetary policy rule in equation (5) using the Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM). This approach has the advantage of providing an estimate of ρq and enables the
researcher to test, using a simple t-ratio test, whether the exchange rate is, per se, a policy objective of
the central bank. In particular, if H0 : ρq = 0 is rejected, then the exchange rate is not a policy target.
6In this chapter, we follow Clarida et al (1998) and identify the systematic components of the Chilean
monetary policy by estimating, directly, a policy speciﬁcation like equation (5).
3 Specifying an IFB Monetary Policy Rule for Chile
In this section we brieﬂy describe the institutional framework in which the CCB operates. In this
context, we specify an IFB monetary policy reaction function relevant for Chile.
3.1 Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies in Chile
The 1980 Chilean Constitution empowers the CCB to “stabilize the value of the currency and provide
normality in the functioning of internal and external payments”. This statement has been interpreted
as giving three main objectives to the CCB: to control inﬂation, to provide a sound regulation of the
banking system and to avoid situations that may lead to currency crises.
From 1980 to 1990, the CCB did not have any explicit target for inﬂation. It is only from 1990
that the CCB adopted an explicit inﬂation targeting regime. The procedure works as follows: each
September, in its Report to the Congress, the CCB announces the CPI inﬂation target for the end of
the following year (December year-on-year CPI inﬂation). This means that the target is announced
ﬁfteen months in advance. In practice, the target was gradually adjusted so as to allow for a gradual
reduction of inﬂation. In fact, in 1990, the target for the following year was set at 27%, whereas in 2001
the target was 3% (see Figure 14).
As is noted by Parrado (2001), the inﬂation targeting regime allows for ﬂexibility; there is no legal
mandate to achieve the target each year. This ﬂexibility, along with the gradual adjustment of the
inﬂation target, have contributed to maintaining high rates of real GDP growth: on average a 6.7%
annual growth rate between 1990 and 2000.
Since 1985, the interest rate has been the main instrument of monetary policy. From 1985 to April
1995, the CCB used a short-term (three months) interest rate indexed to the CPI inﬂation. In May 1995,
the CCB changed its policy instrument to an overnight indexed interest rate which is controlled through
4As in Gallego et al (2002), the inﬂation target series is a linear interpolation of the Chilean central bank December-
to-December targets.
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open-market operations. Those operations are performed by issuing CCB papers and by conducting
repos and anti-repos.
As pointed out by Valdes (1997), the use of indexed interest rates is equivalent to setting ex− post
real interest rates. In this context, there were at least three reasons for using a real interest rate as a
monetary policy instrument. First, the demand for money had been unstable over the period, therefore
the use of interest rate had more predictable eﬀects over output and inﬂation than monetary aggregates.
Second, the high degree of indexation of the Chilean economy (including ﬁnancial contracts) made it
diﬃcult to use nominal interest rates. Finally, in an environment of high and unpredictable inﬂation,
movements in the real interest rates were easy to understand and did not have double interpretations
as in the case of nominal rates5.
The CCB also has the power to set the exchange rate policy. From August 1984 to September
1999, the CCB adopted a crawling exchange rate band. As is noted by Landerretche et al (2000 p.461),
the main objectives of the band were to maintain international competitiveness and reduce excessive
exchange rate volatility. However, since the start of the band, many of its features, including its width,
rate of crawl, reference currency basket, degree of symmetry and central parity were modiﬁed (see
Figure 2). Since September 2, 1999, the country has embraced a fully-ﬂexible exchange rate regime,
5Given a more stable, and low, path for inﬂation, the CCB abandoned, in August 2001, the use of real interest rates as
a policy instrument. Since then, the policy instrument is an overnight nominal interest rate.
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with the possibility of the monetary authority intervening in the market only if the exchange rate does
not reﬂect the “real” value of the foreign currency (Parrado 2001, p.7).
The basic instruments that the CCB used to stabilize the nominal exchange rate, within the band,
were interventions in the foreign exchange market and, in some cases, modiﬁcations to the limits of the
band. As is noted by Parrado (2001), at the end of 1991, Chile’s strong external accounts forced the
CCB to lower the referential dollar exchange rate (central parity) by 5 percent and to widen the band to
± 10 percent. Although this decision was taken to increase the market role in determining the exchange
rate, in March 1992 it was decided that the CCB should have a “dirty” ﬂoating option to intervene
within the band. In this context, intra-marginal foreign-exchange rate interventions by the CCB were
frequent and, at times, intense (Landerretche et al, 2000).
The elimination of the band in September 1999, did not imply the absence of foreign exchange inter-
ventions. In fact, “in response to large exchange rate depreciation and volatility, the CCB announced
and carried out a temporary policy of sterilized interventions between July 2001 and January 20026.
The stated objectives of the interventions were to reduce excessive exchange rate volatility and provide a
6The bank intervened by selling U.S.$800 millions (less than its preannounced ceiling of U.S.$1.5 billion) and issuing
the equivalent of U.S.$3 billion (as announced) in dollar-denominated peso CCB debt (to provide a hedge against future
exchange rate devaluation), Schmidt-Hebbel and Werner (2002. p.72)
9hedge against future devaluations, without aﬀecting exchange rate trends.” Schmidt-Hebbel and Werner
(2002. p.72).
In summary, the CCB has speciﬁc instrument for each target. In particular, the interest rate is
used as the inﬂation targeting instrument whereas sterilized interventions in the exchange rate market,
and sometimes modiﬁcations to the limits of the exchange rate band, were used as instruments of the
exchange rate policy. In this context, one advantage of the framework used in this paper is that it is
possible to test whether the policy interest rate was inﬂuenced by exchange rate considerations.
3.2 A Forward-Looking Model of Policy Interest Rate
Following Clarida et al (1998 and 2000) and Clarida (2001), we specify a forward-looking model for the
monetary policy interest rate. We introduce, however, some modiﬁcations in order to obtain the ex-post
real interest rate that is, in practice, the instrument that has been used by the CCB since 1985.
In a forward-looking environment, the nominal policy interest rate will be determined by current
expectations of the central bank’s objectives. If we assume that the central bank is concerned about
deviations of future inﬂation, output and the exchange rate, we can express the reaction function as
follows
i∗





+ ρyyt + ρqqt (8)
where i∗
t is the nominal interest rate set by the central bank and
¡
Et [πt+n] − π∗
t+n
¢
is the deviation of
expected inﬂation n periods ahead, Et[πt+n], from a predetermined target π∗
t+n
7 and i is the equilibrium
nominal interest rate8. The central bank may also be concerned about deviations of output from the
equilibrium level9, yt, and deviations of the real exchange rate from the steady state, qt.I ti si m p o r t a n tt o
notice that the parameters ρy and ρq capture the non-inﬂationary components of output and exchange
rate deviations. That is, both elements may be objectives of monetary policy even when expected
7In general, the inﬂation target is assumed to be a ﬁxed number. We adopt a more general approach that enables us
to consider the case in which the target is changing over time. This case is of particular importance in economies were
inﬂation is a non-stationary process, and where targets are converging gradually to the long run inﬂation level.
8In fact, when expected inﬂation, output and the real exchange rate are at their equilibrium, or target level,
(Et [πt+n] − π
∗
t+n)=0 ,yt =0a n dqt = 0. It follows that the interest rate is, in equilibrium, i
∗
t = i.
9A central bank that targets inﬂa t i o nw i t hac o n c e r nf o ro u t p u tﬂuctuations is following what Svensson (1997) calls a
gradual approach to inﬂation targeting.
10inﬂation is on target;
¡
Et [πt+n] − π∗
t+n
¢
= 0. Therefore, the speciﬁcation in (8) allows us to test
whether output and the exchange rate are per se objectives of the monetary authorities. In fact, as is
noted in Section 2.2, under the null hypothesis that the central bank is not concerned with output and
real exchange rate deviations, the coeﬃcients ρy and ρq should be equal to zero.
We can re-express the monetary policy interest rate in real terms by subtracting Et [πt+n]f r o mb o t h
sides of (8) and by adding and subtracting π∗
t+n from the right hand side of (8). Hence, the ex-ante,
n-period, real interest rate is expressed as follows
r∗
ea,t = r +( ρπ − 1)
¡
Et [πt+n] − π∗
t+n
¢
+ ρyyt + ρqqt (9)
where r∗
ea,t = i∗
t −Et [πt+n]i st h eex-ante real interest rate and r is the equilibrium real interest rate.
In this speciﬁcation, if ρπ is greater than one, the real interest rate increases whenever expected inﬂation
is above the target level. In this case, the central bank tries to stabilize inﬂation. On the contrary,
when ρπ is less than one, the central bank moves the interest rate in order to partially accommodate
any increase in the expected level of inﬂation. As a result, the monetary authority is not stabilizing
inﬂation.
Now, in order to obtain an expression for the ex-post real interest rate, we add and subtract the
actual inﬂation over t+n on the left hand side of (9). Then, the ex-post real interest rate is deﬁned as
r∗
t = r +( ρπ − 1)
¡
Et [πt+n] − π∗
t+n
¢
+ ρyyt + ρqqt + εt (10)
where r∗
t = i∗
t −πt+n is the central’s bank target level for the ex-post real interest rate. On the other
hand, εt = Et [πt+n] − πt+n is the inﬂation prediction error. The speciﬁcation in equation (10) may be
used to see how the CCB sets its policy interest rate; however, this speciﬁcation does not capture the
tendency that a central bank may have to smooth changes in interest rates. Introducing this tendency
may be a diﬃcult task, so it is assumed, as in Clarida et al (1998), that the policy interest rate, rt,
partially adjusts to its target level, r∗
t. This assumption can be expressed as
rt =( 1− ρ)r∗
t + ρrt−1 + vt (11)
where the parameter ρ [0,1] captures the degree of interest rate smoothing and vt represents a zero
mean real interest rate shock. As is noted by Clarida et al (1998 p.1039), this shock may reﬂect a
11pure random component to the policy or it could arise because the central bank imperfectly forecasts
the demand for reserves. Under this scenario, the interest rate jumps in response to an unexpected
movement in the demand for reserves that is orthogonal to movements in inﬂation, output and the
exchange rate.
Now, we combine equations (10) and (11) to obtain an expression for the policy interest rates that
allows for inertial behavior and depends only on observable variables







+ ρyyt + ρqqt
¤
+ ρrt−1 + ut (12)
where the policy interest rate, rt, is expressed now as a function of realizations of the relevant
variables, plus an error term, ut. This term is a linear combination of the prediction errors and the





β (Et[πt+n] − πt+n)+ρy (Et [yt] − yt)+ρq (Et [qt] − qt)
¤ª
The speciﬁcation in (12) is the expression to be estimated empirically. One advantage of this
formulation is that all the dependent variables are future and current realizations of observable variables.
Therefore, we avoid the problem of modelling, explicitly, the agent’s expectations.
4E s t i m a t i o n
We use data on a monthly frequency10. Information is available from 1986.01 to 2000.12. The estimation
sample is from 1990.09 to 2000.12 which is the inﬂation targeting period.
The policy reaction function to be estimated is equation (12) that contains all the parameters of
interest. In fact, in that speciﬁcation, it is straightforward to test whether the real exchange rate and
the output misalignments are objectives of the central bank - independently of their impact on future
inﬂation. In this case, a simple t-test on the signiﬁcance of ρy and ρq can be performed. If ρy and ρq
are statistically diﬀerent from zero, then it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the central bank
has additional objectives besides controlling inﬂation.
Now, it is evident that the correlation between the error term, ut, and future inﬂa t i o ni n( 1 2 )i s
diﬀerent from zero. In these circumstances, estimating this relationship with Ordinary Least Squares
10Appendix A contains a detailed description of the series we use.
12(OLS) will generate biased estimators. To overcome this problem, equation (12) is estimated using the
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), as in Clarida et al (1998 and 2000).
To apply GMM, it is necessary to impose an orthogonality condition between the error term in (12)
a n das e to fi n s t r u m e n t a lv a r i a b l e st h a tr e ﬂect the information available at time t.I np a r t i c u l a r ,l e tZt
















where the set of instruments is known when the CCB sets the real interest rate, rt.
The above orthogonality condition can be used to estimate, using GMM, the coeﬃcients that char-
acterize the monetary policy reaction function, ρ, ρπ, ρy and ρq. In particular, GMM provides consistent
estimates of the policy coeﬃcients. On the other hand, as is noted by Clarida et al (1998), by con-
struction, the residual series ut features and MA(n − 1) structure and empirical moments cannot be
considered as serially independent. In order to sort out this problem, we follow the estimation proce-
dure suggested by Favero (2001); when implementing GMM estimation we correct for heteroscedasticity
and autocorrelation of an unknown form with a lag truncation parameter of n − 1. Furthermore, Bar-
lett weights are chosen to ensure positive deﬁniteness of the estimated variance-covariance matrix (see
Favero 2001, p.233).
Finally, in order to assess whether a particular set of instruments, Zt,i sv a l i d ,aJ− test of overi-
dentifying restrictions is implemented. This test has a χ2 distribution with m − k degrees of freedom,
where m is the number of instruments used and k is the number of variables to be instrumented.
4.1 Identifying the Cyclical Component in the Series
Some of the explanatory variables are expressed as deviations from the steady state or equilibrium level.
In order to obtain empirical estimates of the output gap, yt, and the exchange rate misalignment, qt,
diﬀerent ﬁltering techniques can be applied. For instance, Parrado (2000), in a similar exercise for Chile,
used a quadratic detrending procedure to obtain the long-run level of output. Then the output gap, yt,
is constructed as the percentage diﬀerence between the output level and its long-term value. Similarly,
Scmidt-Hebbel and Tapia (2002) use the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter to obtain yt and qt.
13In this paper, we use an alternative methodology: in order to determine the output gap, yt,a n dt h e
exchange rate misalignment, qt, a structural times series (STSM) model is ﬁtted to the level of output
and to the level of the real exchange rate. The STSM gives the cyclical component of each series and
we use this component as a measure of the output gap, yt, and the exchange rate misalignment, qt.
Using this approach has the advantage of avoiding the creation of spurious cycles, which can be one
of the consequences of using a HP ad-hoc ﬁltering procedure (see Harvey and Jaeger 1993). Another
advantage of this procedure is that the irregular movements of the series are separated from the cycle.
In this way, the series we obtain do not contain noisy information that is sometimes diﬃcult to interpret.
4.1.1 Trend plus Cycle Model
T h eS T S Mw eu s ei st h et r e n dp l u sc y c l em o d e l 11. Applying this procedure to the Chilean level of
output12 r e s u l t si na no u t p u tg a ps e r i e s ,yt , that is less volatile than the series obtained with the
HP ﬁlter (see Figure 3). On the other hand, the output gap obtained by using linear or quadratic
detrending procedures is much noisier. The cyclical component obtained from the HP, linear and
quadratic detrending procedures is much more volatile, because it includes the irregular movements in
output which appear to be substantial13. On the contrary, when a structural times series model is ﬁtted,
the irregular component is removed from the cycle. As a result, the output gap series in the lower panel
of Figure 3 is less volatile.
From an economic perspective, the cycle obtained with the STSM has a meaningful interpretation.
In fact, it captures many of the stylized facts of the Chilean business cycle. In particular, the slowdown
of the Chilean economy at the beginning of the 90s and the subsequent recovery, between 1992 to 1994,
are well reﬂected by this cycle. On the other hand, the rapid expansion of the economy between 1997
and mid-1998 and the subsequent crisis in 1999 are also captured. Finally, the slow recovery of the
economy in 2000 and 2001 is reﬂe c t e da tt h ee n do ft h ep e r i o d .
To obtain the cyclical component of the real exchange rate, qt, the same procedure as before is
applied: a trend plus cycle model is ﬁtted to the level of the real exchange rate. As before, the cycle
11Appendix B explains, in more detail, the trend plus cycle model.
12The models have been estimated using STAMP 6.0 software.
13Changing the smoothing parameter in the HP does not change the results; for alternative values of this parameter,
the HP cycle is always noisier than the cycle obtained using a structural time series model.
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y (Structural Time Series Model)
obtained by ﬁtting a STSM is less volatile than the cycle obtained using the HP ﬁlter (see Figure 4).
On the other hand, the series obtained with the HP ﬁlter presents a seasonal pattern with appreciations
at the beginning of each year. This may reﬂect changes in seasonality that are not captured by the
HP procedure. In fact, Harvey (2001) argues that changes in seasonality may not be captured by the
non-model-based seasonal adjustment procedure, such as the U.S. Census Bureau’s X-12 used when
ﬁltering by HP. Again, this problem is overcome when using a structural time series model.
The economic interpretation of real exchange rate deviations is more diﬃcult. In fact, there is no
consensus in Chile about the level of the equilibrium real exchange rate in the past decade. Many
economists have suggested that an important degree of real appreciation was present in the 90s, but
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q (Structural Times Series Model)
there is no a clear description of this appreciation path on a monthly basis. In any case, the pressure
over the exchange rate market in 1998-1999 is well reﬂected by the real exchange rate misalignments
presented in Figure 4.
Finally, for inﬂation, we do not need to use any detrending procedure, instead we compute the
inﬂation gap, πt+n − π∗
t+n,a st h ed i ﬀerence between actual inﬂation and target inﬂation14.T h es e r i e s
is presented in Figure 5
14See Appendix A for a description of each variable.










90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01
5R e s u l t s
In this section, we present the results of estimating the policy reaction function in (12) and three
alternative speciﬁcations. As is noted by Clarida et al (1998), in order to implement GMM the interest
rate and the independent variables have to be stationary. We perform a standard Dickey-Fuller test
and the null hypothesis that the series are I(1) is rejected.
We assume n=15, which is consistent with the way in which the CCB sets its inﬂation targets15.
On the other hand, due to the lag in the availability of information, the CCB cannot observe output in
t or in t-116. As a result, at time t the CCB forms expectations about yt−1 based on past information.
In a similar way, the CCB cannot observe perfectly the contemporaneous level of real exchange rate
misalignments; hence, at time t, it forms expectations about qt.
Now, the set of instruments, Zt, includes a constant, ﬁve lags of the output gap (from t-2),t h r e e
lags in the policy interest rate, lags one to six and lag number nine and twelve of the inﬂation gap, three
lags in the real exchange rate, and three lags in the terms of trade variation. In all cases, the J-test17
cannot reject the validity of this set of instruments.
15Each year, the CCB announces, ﬁfteen months in advance, the inﬂation target.
16At time t it is only possible to observe output in t − 2.
17This test has a χ
2
m−k distribution where m is the number of instruments and k is the number of coeﬃcients to be
estimated.
175.1 Linear Policy Response to the Exchange Rate
In the second column of Table 1, we present the result of estimating by GMM the monetary policy
reaction function in (12). The implicit assumption in this formulation is that the policy response to
real exchange rate deviations, ρq, is linear. This assumption will be removed later on.
As expected, the results for show a positive and signiﬁcant response to expected inﬂation, (ρπ−1) =
0.786. This is consistent with the widespread view that, since 1990, the CCB has responded aggressively
to inﬂation deviations from target. On the other hand, CCB’s responses to output, ρy,a n dt ot h er e a l
exchange rate, ρq,a r ep o s i t i v ea n ds i g n i ﬁcant. In particular, it is possible to reject the null hypothesis
that ρy =0a n dρq = 0. This latter result indicates that the CCB had some concerns about output
and real exchange rate deviations, even though they were not explicit monetary policy targets. In
comparative terms, the policy response to the real exchange rate, ρq is larger in Chile than in developed
economies. In fact, relative to the policy response to expected inﬂation (ρq/ρπ), the reaction to real
exchange rate misalignments is ten times bigger in Chile than in Germany and the UK 18 and eight
times bigger than in Japan 19. In a similar way, the relative response to output misalignments, ρy/ρπ,
is also bigger in Chile.
On the other hand, the average real interest rate during this period, r,i s5 . 2 %a n dt h ed e g r e eo f
inertia in the policy is high; ρ =0 .878. However, the degree of policy inertia is somehow lower that
the inertia found in developed economies. In particular, Clarida et al (1998) ﬁnd values for ρ between
ρ =0 .91 and ρ =0 .95.
5.2 Testing the Importance of Lagged Inﬂation
In order to test whether the central bank is, indeed, reacting to expected rather than to past inﬂation, we
estimate an alternative speciﬁcation for the monetary policy reaction function. In particular, we allow
for the possibility that the central bank reacts, also, to lagged inﬂation. By doing so, it is possible to
test whether the IFB monetary policy speciﬁcation in (12) is more appropriate than a backward-looking
Taylor-type monetary policy rule. The extended policy rule that includes lagged inﬂation is
18See Clarida et al (1998 p.1045) who presents, in Table 1, the monetary policy coeﬃcients for Germany and in Table
4( p . 1055) the policy coeﬃcients for the UK.
19See Clarida et al (1998) who presents in Table 2 (p.1047) the policy coeﬃcients for Japan.
18Table 1: Chile: Monetary Policy Rule. Baseline Estimates.
Coeﬃcients Rule in (12) Rule in (13) Rule in (14) Rule in (15)
(adding πt−1) (considers qL
t and qS





















































q − − 0.557
(0.545)
−
J − Test 6.8[0.99] 5.3[0.98] 7.0[0.99] 5.3[0.99]
The J-Test for overidentifying restrictions has a χ2
m−k distribution.
Standard Errors in parentheses () and p-values in brackets []
**Signiﬁcant at 99% and *signiﬁcant at 90%







+ ρyyt + ρqqt +( ρπ − 1)bπt−1
i
+ ρrt−1 + ut (13)
where the coeﬃcient (ρπ − 1)b represents the policy response to lagged inﬂation, πt−1.
We estimate equation (13) using the same set of instruments as before. The results are presented
in Table 1 third column. The policy response to lagged inﬂation, is positive but it is not statistically
signiﬁcant. On the other hand, the policy responses to the rest of the variables increases substantially.
In fact, (ρπ − 1) goes from 0.786 to 2.486, the response to output misalignments, ρy, increases from
1.122 to 4.302 and the policy reaction to the exchange rate, ρq, increases from 0.633 to 3.519. Finally,
the degree of policy inertia, ρ, increases from 0.878 to 0.961.
From the preceding results, it is clear that the long term policy responses, ρπ, ρy and ρq increase
substantially. However, because the inertial coeﬃcient increases, too, the short-term policy responses,
(1-ρ)ρπ,( 1 - ρ)ρy and (1-ρ)ρq do not change as much. In fact, the short-term response to expected
inﬂation, (1-ρ)ρπ, goes from 0.096 to 0.098, the short-term response to expected output, (1-ρ)ρy,g o e s
from 0.136 to 0.169 and short-term response to the exchange rate, (1-ρ)ρq, goes from 0.077 to 0.138.
Hence, introducing the lagged value of inﬂation does not alter, substantially, the short-term policy
responses (the exception being the short-term response to the exchange rate).
5.3 Testing Nonlinear Responses to the Real Exchange Rate
It has been argued, by Calvo and Reinhart (2002), that monetary policy can be determined by exchange
rate considerations. In particular, developing economies may react to exchange rate misalignment
because the abandonment of an exchange rate regime may cause important economic disruptions.
In Chile, the CCB had an explicit band for the nominal exchange rate but, as we discuss in Section
2.2, it was not supposed to use the interest rate to fulﬁll this objective.
In practice, however, the CCB may respond to real exchange rate ﬂuctuations even if those ﬂuctua-
tions are consistent with the nominal exchange rate band. In fact, ﬂuctuations in the exchange rate may
signal a probability of devaluation. In this case, the monetary authorities will try to avoid an exchange
rate collapse by defending a non-explicit exchange rate target. This reaction corresponds to the “fear
of ﬂoating” suggested by Calvo and Reinhart (2002).
20The above argument is also consistent with Vitale’s (2003) theoretical results; a monetary authority
that wants to signal a new level for the exchange rate may use both foreign exchange rate interventions
and the monetary policy instrument. In fact, Vitale (2003), shows that monetary policy decisions and
foreign exchange rate interventions may be correlated. If a central bank is in charge of both interest
rates decisions and foreign exchange rate interventions - as was the case in Chile until September 1999 -
it can intervene in the exchange market to signal the implicit target for the exchange rate. In particular,
it buys (sells) the foreign currency to signal a greater (smaller) than expected target for the exchange
rate. In this case, a reduction (increase) in the interest rate also generates a greater (smaller) than
expected target for the exchange rate. Hence, a reduction (increase) in the interest rate is a policy
reaction that is consistent with this signal. Therefore, when the central bank perceives a real exchange
rate misalignment, it may use both foreign exchange rate interventions and the monetary policy interest
rate to correct it.
In some ways, the fact that ρq > 0 in the (Table 1 second and third column) indicates that the
CCB wanted to stabilize the real exchange rate independently of its inﬂationary impacts. However, it is
diﬃcult to distinguish whether the CCB is reacting just to large real exchange rate misalignments. In
fact, large misalignments may signal a higher probability of real exchange rate collapse therefore they
have to be avoided. On the other hand, relatively small deviations may be transitory events with no
further implications for the exchange rate regime. As a consequence, the central bank may not intervene
in this case.
In order to test whether CCB’s response to the real exchange rate is linear, we re-state equation (12).
In particular, we allow for diﬀerentiated responses to diﬀerent levels of real exchange rate misalignment.
In doing so, we split real exchange rate deviations into “small” and “large” ones 20. Then, equation
( 1 2 )c a nb ee x p r e s s e da s













+ ρrt−1 + ut (14)
where ρL
q is the policy response to large real exchange rate misalignments, qL
t ,a n dρS
q is the policy
response to small real exchange rate misalignments, qS
t .
20We assume that large deviations are equal or greater than 1.5% (in absolute value) and small ones are smaller than
1.5%. Under this assumption, roughly half of the observations in the period 1986.01 to 2001.12 correspond to “large
deviations”.
21The results of estimating equation (14) are presented in Table 1 fourth column21.W ec o n c l u d et h a t ,
in the face of larger real exchange rate misalignments, the CCB reacts more strongly. In particular,
in that case, the policy response to the real exchange rate increases from ρq =0 .633 in the baseline
case to ρL
q =0 .860. On the other hand, the response to small deviations is ρS
q =0 .557 and it is not
statistically signiﬁcant. Therefore, the response to the real exchange rate is nonlinear: the CCB reacts
more aggressively to larger exchange rate misalignments
5.4 Testing the Importance of Longer Expected Inﬂation Horizons





, but to a path of future inﬂation gaps. As suggested by Wadhwani (2000), in the short-
run, policymakers may react to exchange rate ﬂuctuations to stabilize the future path of inﬂation and
not only of speciﬁci n ﬂation targets. In fact, if exchange rate misalignment aﬀects the future path of
inﬂation (relative to the horizon that is considered in the design of monetary policy), then it is possible
that policymakers will react to exchange rate ﬂuctuations, even if those ﬂuctuations do not have any
impact on short-run inﬂation (or, in this case, inﬂation in t + 15). Hence, a positive value of ρq in
equation (12) may just reﬂect a concern for inﬂation beyond t + 15 and not a concern for the real
exchange rate per se.
A way in which we can test the above hypothesis is by re-expressing equation (12) as










+ ρyyt + ρqqt
#
+ ρrt−1 + ut (15)
Now, if the monetary authority wants to stabilize the future path of inﬂation gaps (from n=15 to
24 for instance), then (ρπ − 1) > 0a n dρy and ρq will capture the degree to which CCB is concerned
about output and exchange rate deviations that do not aﬀect this path.
The results of estimating the speciﬁcation in (15) are presented in Table 1 ﬁfth column. In this case,
the central bank reacts to the future path of inﬂation. In fact, (ρπ − 1) = 2.263. On the other hand,
the responses to output deviations and real exchange misalignments are still positive and signiﬁcant.
In particular, ρy =2 .919 and ρq =1 .907.
21This estimation set of instruments does not change.
22The preceding results indicate that, even in the case where longer horizons for the inﬂation deviations
are considered, the CCB is still concerned about output and exchange rate deviations. This result
reinforces the idea that the CCB has additional, non-explicit, objectives besides controlling inﬂation.
6 Robustness Exercises
The results presented so far show that the CCB policy reaction function can be modelled with an IFB
policy rule. In particular, the CCB moves interest rates whenever expected inﬂation deviates from
target. In this context, the CCB is also concerned about output and real exchange rate misalignments.
Furthermore, the response to exchange rate misalignments is nonlinear: in the face of large real exchange
rate misalignments the policy response is more aggressive.
In this section, we test whether the preceding results are robust to alternative deﬁnitions of the
explanatory variables. In particular, we consider the case in which output deviations and exchange rate
misalignments are generated with the non-model based Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter. We also test whether
the CCB reacts to exchange rate deviations from the central parity. Finally, we determine how long it
takes the exchange rate to aﬀect inﬂation. If the pass-through is almost immediate, then the coeﬃcient
ρq may reﬂect a response to very short-term inﬂation rather than a genuine concern about exchange
rate ﬂuctuations.
6.1 Results with the Hodrick-Prescott Filter
In the following exercises, the variables yt and qt are computed using the HP ﬁlter. The set of instruments
i st h es a m ea sb e f o r e . H o w e v e r ,t h eyt and the qt s e r i e st h a ta r ei n c l u d e di nt h i ss e ta r et h es e r i e s
g e n e r a t e dw i t ht h eH Pﬁlter.
In the ﬁrst exercise, the IFB monetary policy rule in (12) is reestimated. The results, presented in
the second column of Table 2, are very similar, in quantitative and qualitative terms, to the results in
the baseline estimation. In particular. the CCB reacts to expected inﬂation deviations from target with
a concern for output and real exchange rate ﬂuctuations.
In the second exercise, we reestimate the IFB rule in equation (13) that allows for a policy response
to lagged inﬂation. Again, the HP ﬁlter is used to compute yt and qt. The results, presented in the
23Table 2: Chile: Monetary Policy Rule. Alternative Estimates






















































q − − 1.017
(0.333)
∗∗ −
J − Test 7.6[0.99] 7.3[0.98] 7.5[0.98] 7.0[0.99]
The J-Test for overidentifying restrictions has a χ2
m−k distribution
Standard Errors in parentheses () and p-values in brackets []
**Signiﬁcant at 99% and *signiﬁcant at 90%
aThe variable qt is deﬁned as the percentage deviation of the observed6.
nominal exchange rate from the central parity of the band.
third column of Table 2, show that the CCB reacts to both expected and lagged inﬂation. As before,
the CCB is concerned about output deviations and real exchange rate misalignments. In fact, the policy
responses, ρy and ρq are both positive and statistically signiﬁcant22.
The third exercise reestimates the IFB monetary policy rule that allows for a nonlinear response
to exchange rate misalignments23, equation (14). In this case, the CCB is reacting to deviations of
expected inﬂation from target as well as to deviations of output from trend. The coeﬃcients (ρπ − 1)
and ρy are positive and signiﬁcant and their value is similar to the baseline estimates presented in Table
1 .I nt h i sc a s e ,h o w e v e r ,t h ep o l i c yr e s p o n s et ot h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ed o e sn o tc h a n g ew i t ht h es i z eo f
22In both cases, the estimated value is below the baseilne estimates.
23In this case we split the qt series generated with the HP ﬁlter in to large and small deviations. Each group contains
the same number of observations.
24the real exchange rate misalignments. In particular, ρL
q =0 .564 and ρS
q =1 .017.
On the other hand, the hypothesis that ρL
q = ρS
q cannot be rejected24. This result sharply contrasts
with the nonlinear response to the real exchange rate found in the baseline case (Table 1 second column).
The reason for this result is that the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter does not separate the irregular component
from the cycle. As a result, the qt series obtained with the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter is much noisier (see
top panel in Figure 4). This fact implies that, for a given level of real exchange rate misalignment,
the qt series obtained with the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter contains an element, the irregular, that makes it
diﬃcult to distinguish whether the level of misalignment is “large” or “small”. In fact, suppose that an
observation has an underlying cyclical component of zero but it also contains a large irregular element.
In theory, this observation should be classiﬁed as a small real exchange rate misalignment (the cyclical
deviation is zero). However, the large irregular element will determine that, in practice, the observed real
exchange rate misalignment is far from zero and therefore this observation will be classiﬁed (wrongly)
as a large misalignment. The preceding problem is absent from the qt series obtained with a structural
times series model and we believe that this is the reason why we ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
ρL
q and ρS
q in the baseline exercise. Also, this is another reason why it is preferable to use the qt series
obtained with a structural times series model.
The last exercise in this subsection consists of testing whether the CCB reacts to an alternative
deﬁnition of the exchange rate misalignment. In particular, given the exchange rate band present in
Chile in the nineties, we test whether nominal exchange rate deviations from the central parity of this
band generate a monetary policy response. In the last column of Table 2 we present the results of
estimating an IFB policy rule with this alternative deﬁnition for the exchange rate. The results show
that the CCB reacts to inﬂation deviations from target (past and expected values) as well as to output
deviations from trend. However, the reaction to exchange rate deviations from the central parity has
the opposite sign, ρq = −0.148. Hence, we do not ﬁnd evidence that monetary policy has been used to
avoid deviations of the nominal exchange rate from the central parity of the band.
6.2 Exchange Rate Pass-through to Inﬂation
As mentioned previously, the ρq coeﬃcient may reﬂect a response to very short-term inﬂation rather
than a genuine concern about exchange rate ﬂuctuations. To see whether this is the case, we estimate




q is 1.305. Hence the H0 cannot be rejected at any conventional conﬁdence level.
25Figure 6: Inﬂation Response to a Real Exchange Rate Shock











-3 (dotted line +/- 2 S.E.)
Baseline Response
Alternative Response
the number of periods that an exchange rate shocks takes to impact on inﬂation. In doing so, we
estimate an unrestricted VAR that contains the following variables: (πt − π∗
t), yt, rt and qt
25.T h e n
we compute the response of inﬂation deviation, (πt − π∗
t), to a real exchange rate shock. The results,
presented in Figure 6, indicates that the maximum impact of a real exchange rate shock is reached
b e t w e e ne l e v e na n ds i x t e e nm o n t h sa f t e rt h es h o c k( s e es o l i dl i n ei nF i g u r e 6 ) .
An alternative response can be generated if we assume that the central bank does not react to real
exchange rate misalignments. This exercise is equivalent to setting to zero the coeﬃcient in the VAR
that captures the interest rate response to the real exchange rate. In this alternative scenario, the
response of inﬂation does not change signiﬁcantly (see Alternative Response line in Figure 6).
The preceding exercises have shown that real exchange rate shocks take between eleven and sixteen





, already contains information about the current level of the real exchange rate, qt.A s
a consequence, the policy response to the real exchange rate, ρq, can be be interpreted as a genuine
concern about real exchange rate misalignments.
25The VAR has two lags according to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).
267 Conclusions
This paper provides empirical evidence on the way in which a small open economy targets inﬂation. In
particular, using as a case study the Chilean inﬂation targeting experience of the nineties, we estimate
the CCB monetary policy reaction function.
We conclude that the CCB has been forward-looking: it responds mainly to anticipated inﬂation as
opposed to lagged inﬂation. Furthermore, we ﬁnd evidence that the CCB has some implicit objectives;
avoiding output and exchange rate deviations from equilibrium. Therefore, even when inﬂation is under
control, the CCB shows some concern about real activity and the evolution of the real exchange rate. In
this respect, the CCB monetary policy can be characterized as a ﬂexible approach to inﬂation targeting,
a sd e s c r i b e di nS v e n s s o n( 1 9 9 7 ) .
On the other hand, the policy response to the exchange rate, and to output as well, is much more
important in Chile than in developed economies. In addition, the CCB’s reaction to real exchange rate
misalignments is nonlinear: it reacts more strongly to large deviations than to small ones. This provides
evidence that the CCB either tries to avoid excessive exchange rate depreciations (fear of ﬂoating), or
tries to avoid appreciations that may reduce the competitiveness of the economy.
The main results are robust to alternative speciﬁcations of the monetary policy reaction function,
to diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the variables and to longer targeting horizons.
A novel feature of this paper is the use of structural time series models to derive long run deviations
in the relevant variables. We believe this is a better alternative to ad-hoc detrending procedures, like
the HP ﬁlter.
Finally, this is a descriptive study that characterize the CCB reaction function in the last decade.
The normative question of whether this policy is optimal cannot be answered in this framework. In this
sense, Chapter 4 assesses the properties of this type of reaction functions in an estimated model of the
Chilean economy.
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Appendix
(Chapter head:)Data
We use monthly time series from 1985.01 to 2002.04. The data are26;
yt:l o gI M A C E C 27 ( S o u r c e :C e n t r a lB a n ko fC h i l e ) .
πt: Year on year CPI variation (Source: Central Bank of Chile).
π∗
t:I n ﬂation target. (Source: Gallego et al(2002)).
et: log of the real exchange rate (Source: Central Bank of Chile).
rt: CCB’s domestic real interest rate. This is a hybrid deﬁn i t i o n : f r o m1 9 8 7t o1 9 9 5i ti st h e
indexed interest rate on the three months CCB instruments (PRBC 90); from 1995 to 2001 it is the
CCB’s overnight indexed interest rate (Source: Central Bank of Chile).
tot: Terms of trade. This variable is used as one of the instruments. (Source: Valdes and Bennett
(2001)).
(Chapter head:)Univariate time series model
A structural time series model is set up in terms of components that have a direct interpretation.
Following Harvey and Jaeger (1993), we specify a univariate time series model as
26Most data are available from the CCB’s webpage; www.bcentral.cl . Alternatively, the data are available, on request,
from the author.
27The IMACEC is a monthly indicator of economic activity, which covers over 90% of Chilean GDP.
33yt = µt + ψt +  t,  t ∼ NID(0,σ2
 )( 1 6 )
where yt is the observed series, µt is the trend, ψt is the cycle, and  t is the irregular component.
The stochastic trend component is speciﬁed as
µt = µt−1 + θt + ηt, ηt ∼ NID(0,σ2
η)( 1 7 )
θt = θt−1 + ζt, ζt ∼ NID(0,σ2
ζ)( 1 8 )
where θt is the slope or gradient of the trend µt. The irregular  t, the level disturbance ηt and the slope
disturbance ζt are mutually uncorrelated.
























where ρ is a damping factor such that 0 ≤ ρψ ≤ 1, λc is the frequency of the cycle in radians and κt
and κ∗
t are two mutually independent white noise disturbances with zero means and common variance
σ2
κ.








, can be carried out by maximum likelihood.
Once this has been done, estimates of the trend, cyclical and irregular components, are obtained from
a smoothing algorithm28.
8 Smooth trend plus cycle model
The model in (16) to (19) can be restricted in order to get a smoother trend. As noted by Harvey
(2002), allowing σ2
ζ to be positive, but setting σ2
η to zero gives an integrated random walk trend, which
when estimated tends to be relatively smooth, this is often referred to as the “smooth trend” model.
The above restrictions can be imposed ap r i o r i , depending on the nature of the series.
In this context, the HP ﬁlter can be understood as a particular case of the smooth trend model. In
fact, this ﬁlter may be rationalized as the estimator of the trend component in a structural time-series
model of the form
28See Harvey and Jaeger (1993) and Harvey (2002) for empirical applications using the STAMP software.
34yt = µt +  t,  t ∼ NID(0,σ2
 )( 2 0 )
where µt is deﬁned by equation (17) to (18) and σ2
η and ψt are set to zero. The optimal ﬁlter of
(20) which gives the detrended observations, yd
















  is the signal-noise ratio and L is the lag operator. As noted by Harvey and Jaeger
(1993), if (20) is believed to be the true model, qζ could be estimated by maximum likelihood. Now,
the HP ﬁltering procedure, assumes that the true model is (20), that is, it is assumed that σ2
η =0a n d
ψt =0 . F u r t h e r m o r e ,av a l u ef o rqζ is imposed, rather than estimated. This value, denoted by qζ,i s
1/14400 for monthly data. Then, the HP detrended series on a monthly basis, yHP








1/14400 + (1 − L)




Therefore, the HP ﬁlter is a restricted smooth trend model in which the cycle component is assumed
to be zero and the signal-noise ratio, qζ, is set to a constant number.
35